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The Medico-Legal Society 
 
A meeting of the Society was held at the Medical Society of London, 11 Chandos 
Street, Cavendish Square, London, W1G 9EB, on Thursday, 11th May, 2017.   The 
President, Dr Daniel Haines, was in the Chair. 
 
 
Medical Manslaughter – Time for a Rethink? 
 
Dr Oliver Quick 
Reader in Law,  University of Bristol  
 
 
The President:   Good evening, ladies and gentlemen  
 
Dr Oliver Quick is Reader in Law  at the University of Bristol Law School and he is 
going to speak about Medical Manslaughter – Is it time for a rethink?   He has a long 
history of interest in the safety of healthcare and, sadly, it is true that dangerous  
doctors have become recognised as a serious public health issue.   It is a little 
alarming for most of us medics here to accept that we are a public health hazard, but 
apparently we are.   This subject is naturally of interest to doctors  but unfortunately it 
is increasingly interesting for litigious lawyers as a potentially lucrative source of 
income, and indeed we have some of them among us here tonight.   (Laughter)    So 
welcome, Dr Quick.   (Applause) 
  
Dr Quick:   Well, thank you, President, and good evening everyone.   I am 
absolutely delighted to be here tonight to address you on the subject of medical 
manslaughter.   I  have very fond memories, as law student some 20 years ago, 
discovering the Medico-Legal Journal in the library at Cardiff University and 
particularly enjoying reading the published talks and the rich discussion that follows 
all of them.   so I am happy  to be here to deliver a talk and look forward to seeing it 
in the pages of the journal. Before I begin can I also  thank Dr Martin Mansell, past 
president of the Society, for inviting me to address you this evening.  
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Medical manslaughter cases have always been controversial and interesting, and even 
more so given the recent successful, and somewhat surprising, appeal of Dr David 
Sellu. I will say a bit about that case in a minute.   But I think it is fair to say that all of 
these cases share one thing in common, that they are sad stories of largely preventable 
deaths: tragedies for the families, and of course the victims, and also shattering for the 
clinicians involved.    
 
There are clearly numerous issues involved in these cases that deserve detailed 
attention and  I will  address what I see as the main medico-legal issues they raise.. I 
will also summarise the findings of some empirical research which I have carried out 
with  prosecutors and expert witnesses, who clearly play key roles in deciding 
whether or not cases are  criminal ones  and, how they proceed through the Criminal 
Justice System. 
 
To address the question  ‘Is it time for a rethink?’  the answer is yes, it is.   But what 
do we mean by a rethink?   Well, it is unlikely that that is going to involve a rethink of 
the law.   The law of gross negligence manslaughter has a long  and somewhat 
troubled history, yet whilst it  remains uncertain it is unlikely to be abolished any time 
soon.   In fact, I don’t think it will be abolished at any time at all.   However, that does 
not mean to say there isn’t a need to rethink the roles of the key actors in such cases; 
police, prosecutors, expert witnesses and judges; and to think carefully about whether 
all cases are being handled fairly? 
 
 
To start with a bit of legal history.   You will need a working knowledge of medieval 
legal French to read this document..       As far as we know, this is the first published 
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conviction of a healthcare professional back in 1329.   I am grateful to Mr Ian Barker, 
senior solicitor from the Medical Defence Union, for sending me this.  Apparently 
there are two  translations of the  case summary - this one says the practitioner was 
‘commended’ to God, whilst another  said the practitioner was ‘condemned’ to God.   
So two quite different interpretations there!    
 
 
However,  the first cluster of cases occurred in the 19th century when we begin to see 
judges talking about gross negligence alongside recklessness without  being too 
worried about  distinguishing between them.     
These are key cases in criminal law  on manslaughter by gross negligence and they 
are probably familiar to everybody. But perhaps we should just remind ourselves very 
briefly of the facts of these leading cases. Only in two convictions, those of  of Dr 
Percy Bateman and  Dr David Sellu, were appeals successful.   
Dr Bateman was an obstetrician dealing with a difficult delivery.   The baby was in 
the breech position and in performing a manual version he mistakenly removed part of 
the patient’s uterus and caused other internal damage, resulting in  death.   He was 
convicted, although his appeal was allowed largely on the basis that the trial judge had 
not given the jury sufficient detail about deciding what we mean by gross negligence. 
In the recent appeal of Dr David Sellu, the Court of Appeal similarly found that the 
trial judge had  failed to direct the jury in sufficient detail about  gross negligence.  It 
is not  entirely clear what further detail judges could give juries in order for them to 
decide this ultimate issue, but it is interesting that only these two cases were  
successfully appealed. 
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Dr Adomako was a locum anaesthetist who took too long to spot a disconnected 
oxygen tube during a routine eye operation. 
 
Drs Misra and Srivastava were Senior House Officers who failed to diagnose and treat 
a serious infection in a patient recovering from a knee operation. 
 
Dr Garg was a Consultant Urologist who was too slow to order a scan on his patient 
with a kidney infection.   There was also evidence that he tampered with the medical 
notes after the patient had died. 
 
More recently,  is the conviction of Dr David Sellu, a Consultant Colorectal Surgeon.   
The prosecution’s case was that he was too slow to order a CT scan and operate on a 
patient with a suspected perforated bowel. 
 
One preliminary question can be quite quickly dealt with, namely,  should the 
criminal law  be involved at all in dealing with medical errors?   I’d be interested in 
your thought sin the discussion,  but I would be surprised if even the staunchest 
sympathiser of the medical profession would call for a blanket ban on criminalisation.   
Some events will always be beyond the pale and warrant a criminal response.   But 
clearly the tough task (and it remains, I think, as tough today as it was in the days of 
the case of Bateman) is to settle on a morally meaningful and fair framework for 
culpability.   Given that these cases involve a wide range of conduct from the 
blatantly reckless to the momentary slip, this is far from straightforward.    
 
Here are  two good illustrations of the  breadth of cases that are captured by this  
category of criminal fault. First, the case of Dr Gray, who in 1952 was convicted 
following the death of his patient.   He was an anaesthetist who was well known for 
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sniffing anaesthetic gases, and he did this prior to this operation and failed to take care 
of the patient.   Well, I think everybody would agree that such conduct is blatantly 
reckless.  But this is a world away  from  the case  of Dr Falconer, another 
anaesthetist, prosecuted in 2006 for a momentary slip.   He fatally injected oxygen 
into the wrong tube going into the vein rather than the abdomen of the baby that was 
being operated on.   He was acquitted. These are clearly conceptually distinct, one a 
clear violation, the other a momentary slip.   Morally, I think they are quite different, 
but legally speaking both are swept up by the broad, and somewhat brutal brush of 
gross negligence. 
 
Now, legal philosophers have for a long time debated the appropriateness of negligent 
liability in criminal law.   We know that negligence has a fairly long history in civil 
law and has an equally long history in criminal law, but precisely what is  meant by 
“gross negligence” and also whether it  should be an appropriate basis for criminal 
liability has been a matter of debate for a long time. 
 
 
Leading philosophers of criminal law have long wondered about negligence liability.   
H.L.A. Hart defended negligence liability, or “culpable inadvertence” as he called it.   
Glanville Williams was more critical   regarding it as “an unrewarding exercise in 
moralism” in focusing in on a particular mental deficiency, for example forgetfulness.   
However, its retention has been supported by the  Law Commission, who have 
reviewed this area twice in the last decade or so, and  concluded that the law of 
homicide would be deficient without  manslaughter by gross negligence.   But I think 
it is fair to say that, from a prosecutorial perspective, one of the merits of this test (and 
we will have a look at what the test says in a moment) is that it is incredibly 
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malleable.   It is something that can apply to a wide range of different types of cases, 
usually  involving individuals with caring responsibilities.    
 
 To my mind, “gross negligence” is too broad, too vague and potentially unfair, and I 
would prefer  the threshold of fault to be raised  to recklessness.   I think there is some 
merit inmaking it harder to prosecute cases that are on the cusp: cases where perhaps 
the evidence isn’t that strong. 
 
Just to turn for a moment then to the current test of liability, or the four limbs to this 
area of law: the duty of care; a breach of that duty, which causes, or significantly 
contributes, to the death of the victim; and then, crucially, those cases will hinge on 
whether that breach was so bad that it should be judged criminal.   
 
This is a paraphrasing of the test from the leading case of Adomako, the House of 
Lords decision  in 1995, where Lord Mackay, giving the only judgment in the case, 
provided  the leading common law definition of gross negligence.   Now, he 
acknowledged in his judgment that this test was circular, that if the jury asked (and 
juries often do ask) ‘How negligent must the defendant have been so as to be 
criminal?’ the correct answer is ‘So negligent as to deserve a conviction for 
manslaughter’.   So clearly there is an element of circularity to this test.   However, it 
has survived numerous challenges through these cases.   Most defendants, through 
their barristers, have attacked the basis of liability, arguing that the law is 
insufficiently clear – in short, it is  uncertain and unfair. 
 
 
In the case of Misra and Srivastava  Lord Chief Justice Judge defended this 
uncertainty in the law.   Here are two  interesting extracts from the judgment, where 
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he says (and to my mind unconvincingly) that there is no uncertainty in the definition 
of the law; the law is clear; the only uncertainty is in the decision-making process for 
those who are interpreting the law; so for the police, for prosecutors and of course 
ultimately, for cases that proceed to trial, for juries.   Well,  with respect to the Lord 
Chief Justice, I’m not sure that makes a great deal of sense.   One can see why he  
wanted to defend this basis of liability, but surely if prosecutors and others (and we 
know this through empirical research) struggle to interpret this legal test, that must 
have something to do with the fact that the legal test itself is inherently vague.   In 
short, it is too  broad and uncertain. 
 
Cases such as  Misra and Srivastava,  Adomako and the recent case of Dr David Sellu 
have, unsurprisingly, caused lots of concern amongst healthcare professionals and 
others who are at risk of prosecution for such an offence and have attracted lots of 
academic interest. Here are three books that have been published within the last 
decade that I would recommend to you, and of course this research goes beyond cases 
of manslaughter and looks at other areas where the health system and the criminal 
justice system can interact. 
 
 
I should also acknowledge a rather good recent dissertation that I was fortunate to 
read  by Dr Martin Mansell. It is an extremely informative and well written LLM 
dissertation on the criminal prosecution for medical negligence, which I gather was 
awarded quite a good mark. 
 Dr Mansell:   It’s a secret. 
 Dr Quick:   It’s a secret.   Well, I won’t reveal the mark then.   Suffice to say, 
you are not disappointed with the mark, let’s put it like that. 
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 Dr Mansell:   No, no. 
 Dr Quick:   Okay.   How many cases are there?    This is a matter of some 
debate.   Has there been  an increase in prosecutions and convictions?   Well, 
unfortunately the available data is not sufficiently reliable to draw any firm 
conclusions here.   The Crown Prosecution Service tell us they don’t collect or code 
these cases as medical cases, they fall within a bigger category of killing through 
gross negligence, and they can’t present figures on cases involving healthcare 
professionals.   Now, clearly that must be possible, but I suppose it would take some 
work in order to pick out those cases. 
 
 
The best available evidence we have is from literature reviews,  mainly of newspaper 
reporting and case studies in the medical press. The most widely cited is that by  
Robin Ferner and Sarah  MacDowell, from the  University of Birmingham, who  
found that 85 doctors were charged between 1795 and 2005, with 44 of those between 
1975 and 2005 
The other notable research that has been done within the last decade is by Daniel 
Griffiths and Andrew Sanders, then at the University of Manchester.   They reviewed 
75 CPS case files between 2005 and 2009 and found that only 4 of those cases led to 
prosecution, making clear that, if there is an increase, it is an increase of police 
investigations, rather than  prosecutions. 
 
One thing we can be clear on is that the conviction rate seems to have increased.   I 
have looked at these cases from around  the 1950s to the current day and it seems that 
the conviction rate fluctuated between 30 and 35%, which is relatively low for this 
category of crime.  However,  a review by White published in the BMJ in 2015  found 
that the conviction rate had risen  to 55% between  2006 and 2013. 
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The other point we can note is that more convictions are ending in custodial 
sentences.   Whereas a suspended sentence was once the norm for a guilty verdict, 
now it seems as though custodial sentences are not uncommon. This followed changes 
introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and applied by the Court of Appeal in the 
case of Garg.  
 
Why do cases become cases?    Why do some tragic fatalities end in criminal 
prosecutions whilst others do not? 
 
 
Well, these seem to be  the key factors which  influence ‘The road to the dock’, as it 
were.     
▪ the character of victims (especially age and vulnerability)  
▪ families being active and searching for justice through the criminal justice 
system  
▪ publicity;  
▪ the role of coroners, particularly with prevention of future death reports 
(Regulation 28 reports)  
▪ interviews of suspects; so what suspects say in interview  
▪  liaison between the police and the CPS  
▪ instructing experts/getting the right experts 
▪ the role of the so-called elite prosecutors of the Special Crime and Counter 
Terrorism Division that handle and make the decision whether or not to 
prosecute  
And, as the data suggests, the CPS only prosecute a small number of referrals they 
receive – around  three or four cases a year. 
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The other factor, which I think is particularly interesting and controversial, involves 
the character of defendants.   It seems to me, having looked at these cases, that they 
are  as much about the character of a defendant, or perhaps perceptions about  
character, as they are  about the actual conduct in question. In particular, the 
defendant’s response to the events appear to feed into the assessment of  gross 
negligence. Given the vagueness of gross negligence perhaps it is  unsurprising that 
attention focuses on factors beyond the actual incident in order to search for evidence 
suggesting gross negligence.   
 
 
When I first started looking at these cases in some detail what  struck me was the 
seemingly disproportionate number of prosecutions against non-white practitioners. In 
a paper I published in 2006, I said that whilst the  whilst the statistics are small, it 
suggests that over 50% of prosecutions  
 
involve non-white practitioners, which is disproportionate compared to the number of 
non-white practitioners working within the health system. Now,  caution is required 
here, because the data is unreliable, so unfortunately we can’t speak too confidently 
about what is going on here. 
 
 
In fact, we should note that a study of  75 closed cases conducted by Griffiths and 
Sanders between 2004 and 2009  showed no cleardisproportionality.   Some 56% of 
the cases they looked at involved white practitioners, 3% black, 21% Asian and 20% 
unknown.   The latter is  quite a large category and it is a pity that information about 
the ethnicity of  defendants was  not available for those cases.  
 
Now, whilst I think caution is required around this issue, one thing that we do know 
(and again the numbers are small) is that the data on conviction rates is quite stark.   
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Between 2012 and 2017,  to the best of my knowledge, there have been 7 practitioners 
from the UK and 9 practitioners from outside of the UK by place of primary medical 
qualification prosecuted, and the conviction rate of cases proceeding to trial is 0% for 
those from the UK and 78% for those from outside the UK.   Now, again we need a 
longer time span of cases to measure whether that finding is represented over a longer 
period of time, but clearly that does raise some suspicion about the possibility (I say 
no more than that) of prejudice creeping in to the construction of cases. Clearly,  
further research is needed here. 
 
 
 
▪ Now, of course prejudice (if indeed it does play a role) is not the only 
explanation for this.   Clearly there are lots of other factors which are relevant 
here such as education and training, language skills,working 
environment,support and supervision, and luck.  
But I think we would be a bit naive to discount the potential role of prejudice in why 
cases become cases and how they are handled throughout the process. 
 
I thought I would now say a little bit about some research findings from studies I have 
conducted into how prosecutors and expert witnesses negotiated their roles in these 
cases. 
 
As I mentioned, medical manslaughter cases are classed as highly complex criminal 
work that should be dealt with by the Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division 
of the CPS.   There is no getting away from the fact that  they find it difficult to apply 
the Adomako test of gross negligence in this context, and they describe their work as 
being difficult, dynamic, and prone to delays in gathering evidence. They  have to 
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deal with the police, who begin all investigations and who will almost certainly lack 
experience of conducting investigations in the medical context.  
 
Here are  two  quotes which  reflect the difficulty of interpreting gross negligence.     
 
So here is  a quote from a prosecutor interviewed in 2006, saying, “Well, you know, 
we agonised over this case.   Some said prosecute, some said don’t prosecute.   It 
wasn’t clear cut and we took a long time.   It was a borderline case”. 
 
 
And another which suggests that prosecutors actually apply the higher standard of 
recklessness:  “Whilst the law says it is an objective test; in other words, the test of 
negligence; in reality we’re looking for subjective recklessness.   It is really a case 
where we say it is so blindingly obvious that the person must have realised, and 
therefore they are subjectively reckless”.    
 
I think this is an interesting quote, because if you look back at the early cases of 
medical manslaughter, and indeed at some of the more recent ones, judges do use the 
term ‘recklessness’ in describing gross negligence.   So it seems as if, whilst these are 
not synonyms, whilst recklessness implies a greater degree of moral blame , 
nevertheless in Adomako and in Misra and Srivastava the Appeal Court Judges were 
hinting that it was legitimate to focus on recklessness.   In fact, what we will see in a 
moment, with the judgment in the Sellu case, is the Court of Appeal talking about 
“exceptionally bad gross negligence”, which further suggests that  the courts are  
subtly raising the bar of liability to a test of recklessness. 
 
The dominant impression I had after conducting interviews with prosecutors was that 
whilst they were elite lawyers, highly trained specialists in this area, they would  not 
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prosecute without at least two expert reports testifying to the grossness of the 
negligence.   That is a very interesting finding because, strictly speaking, gross 
negligence is the ultimate issue for the jury and  is a legal term of art. However,  
prosecutors  partly devolved  that question to experts, even though there is no legal 
requirement for them to do so.     
 
That in itself raises an interesting question, which again is covered in the appeal 
judgment in the Sellu case, as to what exactly experts are supposed to do in such 
cases.   Can experts testify that the conduct is gross?    The short answer is they 
shouldn’t, because that is not their job, and that is one of the reasons, reading between 
the lines, the Sellu appeal was successful, because the appeal court had reservations 
about experts using the language of “gross negligence” and therefore treading on the 
toes of the jury in appearing to answer the ultimate issue. 
 
 
There are a number of really important issues around experts, with two key issues 
standing out: 
▪ What is the appropriate role of expert witnesses and what is the  nature of 
expertise required in medical manslaughter cases? 
A good example is provided by the  convictions of the Junior Orthopaedic Surgeons  
in Southampton, Drs Misra and Srivastava. .   This is a case that involved a failure to 
diagnose toxic shock syndrome.   All the evidence came from toxicologists and 
microbiologists, and there is a question about whether it is appropriate for laboratory 
doctors to judge the conduct of clinicians working at the coalface of care? 
 
There are thus key questions around: 
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▪  How experts are selected. 
▪ How much  authority and freedom they have. 
▪ The  relationship between experts, lawyers and judges. 
▪ The issue of jury usurpation. 
▪ And how can experts be regulated or managed within the  criminal justice 
system? 
 
Again here are some quotes from my empirical research which I think are worth 
reflecting on.  
 
Here is a quote touching on empathy.   Are the right experts being consulted to pass 
judgment in terms of the facts of a particular case? 
‘I thought they were wrong for a number of different reasons. I mean one hadn't done 
any proper clinical work . . . he was a pathologist . . . you know when was the last 
time he actually saw a living patient? Probably not for 20 years. And things have 
changed quite a lot in 20 years…there were two of us that were actively practising in 
intensive care that actually knew what it was like to have to come in at 2 in the 
morning and deal with stuff . . . and the others were not in that situation at all.’ 
 
 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that experts have authority, because clearly the nature of 
being an expert is to have authority, to be confident, and something that became very 
clear in conducting interviews with experts is that experts – this quote is fairly 
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representative of most experts interviewed – felt that they were setting the rules of the 
game, as it were, that they were offering the correct definition of gross negligence. 
‘If I say they haven't [acted with gross negligence], then they [the prosecution] don't 
do anything. If I say that they have fallen seriously below that standard, then they 
usually charge them. But not always.’ 
 
 
One expert confessed to making up his own definition: ‘something that no reasonably 
competent doctor could have done’.   He preferred not to use the  term “gross 
negligence”, and wisely so given the judgment in the case of Sellu.   He preferred the 
favoured formulation of the  Law Commission document, ‘where a person has fallen 
seriously and significantly below the standard expected of them. ’ This seems to be  a  
more neutral, less legalistic version of gross negligence. 
 
 
I will race through some of these quotes as I have probably got too many for the time 
we have left.   Some of the important questions which need to be discussed are about  
the appropriate role of experts,  whether they are  too active in terms of becoming 
team players, and the relationship between experts, lawyers and the adversarial 
system. Ultimately, there is the risk that experts  potentially lose independence and 
impartiality  whilst being swept up within the adversarial legal system. 
 
I mentioned the risk of jury usurpation, the risk of experts telling juries what to do.   
Of course, strictly speaking, that is not true; juries are making their own minds up; but 
certainly there has been a concern for some time that in this area of a risk that 
particularly charismatic, confident experts might appear to be determining the 
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ultimate issue and a risk that juries may feel that they are being told “This is grossly 
negligent, therefore you should convict the defendant”. 
 
 
This was acknowledged in the David Sellu appeal.   This is the case I mentioned at the 
outset of the colorectal surgeon who was convicted in November 2013 after being too 
slow to order a CT scan and to perform surgery on a patient with a suspected 
perforated bowel.   It should be said that this patient wasn’t originally his patient.   
The patient had a  knee operation and during recovery  experienced some tummy pain 
and the orthopaedic surgeon asked Dr Sellu to check on the patient and in short, he 
took too long to operate on the patient who sadly  died.   He was convicted and, I 
think controversially,  sent to a high security prison for two years.   I think he served 
15 months of that sentence. 
 
 
 
I think what was interesting, and certainly surprising given the fate of other 
defendants in this context, is that he was successful at his appeal. The Appeal Court 
Judge, Sir Brian Leveson, acknowledged this risk of jury usurpation when he said 
that: “Experts might be able to place negligence on a spectrum....but this assistance 
needs to be considered by the jury in the context of all the circumstances as the jury 
find them to be, rather than as evaluated by the experts”. 
 
He then went on to say (and this is particularly interesting) that had the judge directed 
the jury in terms of treatment being “truly exceptionally bad” Dr Sellu could have had 
no complaint.   In short, that was the misdirection of the trial judge, that he hadn’t put 
it to the jury that gross negligence meant treatment that was truly exceptionally bad.    
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Now, in fact, if we look at the cases, the terms ‘exceptionally bad’, ‘abysmal’, ‘gross 
negligence’, ‘recklessness’ are used interchangeably in these cases, so it is not entirely 
clear whether the judge’s jury direction in Sellu was that different from in other cases. 
It seems to me slightly odd  that somebody’s fate could fall on whether or not the trial 
judge used a synonym for gross negligence, as seems to be suggested here by Sir 
Brian Leveson. 
 
The most recent appeal judgment was that involving a paediatric doctor from 
Leicester, Hadiza Bawa-Garba.   In her appeal, again heard by Sir Brian Leveson, he 
made reference to the need to establish  a ‘truly exceptional degree of negligence.’   In 
fact her appeal was unsuccessful, but nevertheless  reference to  exceptionally bad or 
an exceptional degree of negligence seems to move the test closer towards 
recklessness.  
 
Now, I think one of the chief debating points with cases of gross negligence, and 
indeed I suppose you could say for any legal intervention, is what impact does it 
have?    We know that there is a punishment aspect to such cases, but is there a 
deterrent effect?    What is the impact of criminal law in this context?    Well, I 
suppose the short answer is that we just don’t really know, but certainly there is a 
strong body of opinion which says that such cases play a negative role in terms of 
trying to encourage a culture which is conducive to safer healthcare. 
 
 
A  survey  conducted in 2016 and cited in The Guardian  claimed  that doctors were 
avoiding risky operations due to the threat of prosecution.   668 doctors completed the 
survey and 70% admitted practising so-called ‘defensive medicine’.   80% believed 
that criminal law was impacting negatively on a climate of openness and 
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transparency.   Now, I think that is clearly worrying, although it should be said that 
survey research is clearly not the same thing as actual practice research.   People may 
say one thing to a survey researcher and do another thing in their daily practice.   So I 
think perhaps some caution is required around this notion of defensive medicine, 
whether it is definitely happening or, as one recent literature review by van Dijck has 
suggested, that it is all in the mind rather than operating in reality.  
 
For what it is worth, I think that medical manslaughter cases are so few and far 
between and so damaging to everybody involved that it is highly unlikely that they are 
positive from a  patient safety perspective.   I think probably that is the wrong 
question to ask about these cases, but whether they have got any kind of value in 
terms of improving levels of safety I think is improbable.  That is not to say that other 
areas of criminal law, particularly regulations enforced by the Care Quality 
Commission, for example, may not have a more profound effect on delivering safer 
healthcare, but sporadic prosecutions of errant practitioners is, I would say, unlikely to 
lead to any positive effect around patient safety. 
 
Okay, so what should be done about all of this?   The title of the lecture was “Time 
for a Rethink?”    So what do I think?   Well, as I said at the start, to my mind ‘gross 
negligence’ is too vague and, despite valiant attempts by Appeal Court Judges to 
defend and protect ‘gross negligence’, it is uncertain,  unfair and whilst  caution  is 
required regarding the data, it is potentially the case that that unfairness is felt more 
by some than by others. 
 
I would raise the bar of fault to recklessness. This  wouldn’t solve all the problems in 
this area but, given that that is a slightly stiffer test of liability, would  
 
perhaps lead to weaker cases not becoming cases in the first place. 
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I think there is also a good argument for detailed prosecutorial guidance for this 
offence.   Some of you may remember a few years ago the CPS, after a legal 
challenge, had to publish detailed guidance on factors for and against whether to 
prosecute individuals for  assisted suicide.   Well, one could argue that, on the same 
basis, why not have similar guidance in this context. 
 
I think, connected to that, there is an argument here for greater use of professional 
codes of conduct, safety protocols/guidelines around the treatment of patients in 
particular situations to try and, as it were, compensate for the vague form of mens rea 
here.   Perhaps professional codes of conduct and evidence based practice can provide 
some detail in order to assess this  rather vague legal test. 
 
But beyond the law, the  biggest problem which needs attention is around the 
regulation of  experts and expert evidence.   I think that is acknowledged to be a big 
problem, not only in this area, and given the stakes in such cases and the 
consequences for those involved,  the appropriate management of experts required 
careful consideration.     
 
I return  to the question about  the nature of  expertise required in these  cases, and if 
you think about the questions that experts are asked to comment on in medical 
manslaughter cases they are essentially two.   One is how bad is the conduct?   Do you 
think it is grossly negligent?    And secondly, did it cause the death, or did it 
significantly contribute towards the death?   Well, the second question clearly is one 
where medical forensic expertise is critical to answer that question.   That is  a matter 
of scientific evidence and  we clearly need experts to help courts answer that question.   
But the gross negligence question is arguably much less about science or medicine 
and more about morality, more about gut feeling and a sense of  fairness. This is 
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where difficulties arise in such cases with the risk that an unduly wide range of factors 
may creep into the  assessment of the grossness of the negligence.  
 
One of the areas that certainly needs attention  is the relationship between judges and 
experts.   If we think about the case of David Sellu for a moment, the Court of Appeal 
Judge Brian Leveson was critical of a misdirection by the trial judge but also critical 
of one of the prosecution experts for using the language of ‘gross negligence. ’ Whilst 
that wasn’t strictly speaking the reason for allowing the appeal, nevertheless he 
expressed reservations about experts using the language of liability, the ultimate issue, 
and so it raises the question how was the expert allowed to talk in those terms?    He 
allegedly used the term six times during the trial.   If that was wrong, how was the 
expert allowed to do that at trial?   So  there are real questions there around how 
judges manage or set the boundaries for what is appropriate evidence to give and then 
regulate that through criminal trials. 
 
I will finish in a moment, but just to say that the two most recent cases to come before 
the appeal courts involving Dr Rudling, where there was no case to answer, and Dr 
Bawa-Garba, whom I mentioned and whose appeal failed, suggest to me that, in terms 
of rethinking this area, we are, perhaps understandably, reliant on judges to further 
refine what we mean by ‘gross negligence’, and it seems as if, on looking at those 
judgments, there  is a consensus that the term ‘exceptionally bad negligence’ seems to 
be preferable to ‘gross negligence’.   Now, I don’t know about you, but I am not sure 
that if I was on a jury I would find that particularly helpful as it is merely a  synonym 
for grossness.   So I don’t think that the definitional problem in this area goes away, 
but nevertheless it seems to be an area where it is going to be for judges to rethink and 
manage, rather than for Parliament. 
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Okay, I will stop there and invite some questions from the floor and I look forward to 
discussion. 
 
Discussion 
The President:   Thank you very much indeed, Oliver.   That was a fascinating 
introduction to the problem, even if you haven’t solved it.   If you have any questions, 
please give your name and your field of interest? 
 Dr Palmer:   Hello.   Roy Palmer, recently retired Coroner, but before that I 
worked for the Medical Protection Society and had the privilege of taking the 
Adomako case up to the House of Lords.   In view of what you have just been saying, 
(I think I wholeheartedly agree with you), what are the prospects of the House of 
Lords revisiting the test and saying “Actually, we got it wrong.   It shouldn’t have 
been ‘gross negligence’, it should have been ‘recklessness’”, because that was the 
issue really that was at the core of Adomako?    If I recall correctly, there were about 
three simultaneous appeals that went up; Adomako was only one; and the issue was 
that in some cases the trial judges had given directions on the basis of gross 
negligence and in another they had given a direction on the basis of recklessness, and 
the view was that it was unfair that ‘A’ had been found guilty on one test and not the 
other.  They had the opportunity, but, as you say, there was only one speech from 
Lord Mackay; it was a fairly short one and it was entirely circular.   What are the 
prospects of the House of Lords going back and saying “Actually, we got it wrong; it 
should be ‘recklessness’”? 
 Dr Quick:  I agree, and I think we do need a case of medical manslaughter to 
reach the Supreme Court, as it now is.    The best opportunity for that would have 
been the case of Misra and Srivastava.   They challenged the conviction on the same 
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grounds that Dr Adomako challenged his conviction, that gross negligence  breaches 
the rule of law requirement; it is unclear, it is uncertain; and I think, looking at the 
judgment there, that argument was given short shrift, it wasn’t given the attention it 
deserved.   So I totally agree with you that we do need a case to go to the Supreme 
Court for  a judicial rethink about  the correct test for liability and how best to explain 
this to juries.   I think, though, if we do get that case, I kind of worry for the judges – 
well, I don’t worry too much for them -  but looking at these cases right through 
history, the terms ‘gross negligence’ and ‘recklessness’, which are clearly quite 
closely connected, are used in almost all the cases.   But as the language of law 
evolves, there may be an argument for adopting the suggestion of the Law 
Commission, which was in one of the experts referenced in one of the quotes I put up, 
and indeed what now features in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act, ‘a standard falling far below what we would expect of the individual in the 
circumstances’.   What are the prospects of that?    Well, I am not sure that the 
prospects are that good really.   It has been a long time since Adomako and we only 
have three or four of these cases a year and only half of them result in convictions, so 
I wouldn’t be too confident that we will have a case reaching the Supreme Court, but I 
agree with you that that would truly help give us some clarity. 
 Dr Afif:   I am Michele Afif, previously paediatrician, now with the Medical 
Protection Society.   I am particularly interested in the Bawa-Garba case.   There was 
such a lot in that case that really related to systems rather than to individuals and so 
little gets actually said in practice about the accountability of others who perhaps are 
not medical.   What are your thoughts on that? 
 Dr Quick:   Yes, I think that is probably true.   It is not every case as there are 
some cases where it is purely an individual’s  error, but I think you are absolutely 
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right that in the vast majority of these cases that error is within a broader system and 
that certain people have been unlucky and that other individuals may have a case to 
answer.   The Sellu case is perhaps a good example of this, in that the private hospital 
where that care took place did do a root cause analysis which raised some questions 
about their provision of cover in an emergency situation, which I don’t think they 
were too forthcoming in presenting that evidence at his trial.   Now, if I can flip back 
for a moment to the words of Lord Mackay in Adomako, he talks about ‘reference to 
all the circumstances’.  So strictly speaking, the legal test does require the assessment 
of fault with reference to all the circumstances. But  whether all the circumstances are 
given due weight in the trial relies on that evidence becoming apparent and on that 
evidence being interpreted appropriately.  Again, the Sellu case is quite revealing 
here.   In the sentencing remarks the judge found it was an aggravating feature that 
this care took place in a private hospital.   He said words to the effect of “Well, this 
didn’t take place in an under-funded, overstretched NHS hospital, this took place in a 
private hospital.   This is even worse”.   In actual fact, as medics in the room will 
know, and perhaps the lawyers in the room will know, the opposite was true, that the 
patient would have been safer in an NHS hospital, where there would have been on 
call anaesthetic cover and the procedure may well have taken place sooner and the 
patient may well have survived.   So I wholeheartedly agree with your point.   I think 
it is a critical point in these cases that the context requires careful understanding of the 
factors that explain why patient safety incidents occur in the first place.   I think what 
would be helpful as the research base for improvement science or patient safety 
research increases, is that we get a better understanding of how things happen in the 
first place, a better understanding of the role of systems in trying to prevent tragedies. 
 25 
 Mr Coonan:   I thoroughly enjoyed your talk.   May I say that I don’t agree 
with a lot of it.   Perhaps I should introduce myself.  I am Kieran Coonan, Queen’s 
Counsel, and I defended in three, if not four, of the cases that you have cited, 
including David Sellu.   Can I just ask you, first of all, about the premise of this 
address?   Do you agree that there is no offence of medical manslaughter? 
 Dr Quick:  Yes, the offence is manslaughter by gross negligence. Medical 
manslaughter is just a type of case.   
 Mr Coonan:   But of course that offence, albeit an entirely different crime for 
medics, applies equally to gas fitters, electricians, farmers...... 
 Dr Quick:   School teachers. 
 Mr Coonan:   ....school teachers, everybody, and whilst I can see that there 
may be disquiet in some respects, that disquiet would have to apply to that category, 
would it not, of individuals, not just doctors? 
 Dr Quick:   Absolutely, and I wasn’t for one minute suggesting that the 
medical profession or healthcare professionals should have some special exemption 
here.   It just happens to be the area that I am talking about tonight, but I think the law 
in this area, because it is vague, can also be unfair on other professionals.   It is not 
only professionals but it is mainly professionals who are caring for those who are 
vulnerable, but I think the same arguments apply whether or not it applies to a medic 
or a school teacher or carer. 
 Mr Coonan:   I entirely agree.   Can I just ask you about the question of 
systems, which the last speaker raised? 
 Dr Quick:   Yes. 
 Mr Coonan:   Certainly in my experience, which goes back 35 years, the 
issue of systems is catered for, and catered for well, in the trial process.   In some 
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cases the issue of systems is not deployed.   Why?    Because the defence don’t think 
it is profitable.   That is the first point.   Secondly, the issue of systems is deployed, 
again in my experience, in determining whether there was an error in the first place; in 
other words, a straightforward Bolam error; or whether it was (to use the compendious 
term) ‘gross negligence’ or not.    It also is deployed in causation, and it is finally 
deployed when it comes to sentence.   Sellu wasn’t a case involved with that; other 
ones were.   So I am just wondering what your view is: are you saying that systemic 
factors are not taken into account, by your reading of these cases? 
 Dr Quick:   No, I don’t think I said that in the talk. 
 Mr Coonan:   All right. 
 Dr Quick:   I certainly don’t say that it is not taken into account.   You have 
obviously got massively more experience of these cases in the courtroom and I agree 
with you, based on the research I did with prosecutors, that they very deliberately look 
at context and they carefully consider the negligence in the context in which it occurs. 
But I am less sure (you may be able to enlighten us) that this always gets the due 
attention at trial. 
 Mr Coonan:   Well, I was spurred to make the observation because last year, I 
think in the middle of September, or thereabouts, there was a letter written to The 
Times, signed by about 150 doctors and others, following the conviction of the 
optometrist in Ipswich.   Now, the point there was precisely that, that systems were 
not taken account of, and I just wanted to express the view, so far as that is a widely 
held view, that that is simply untenable. 
 Dr Quick:   The  Sellu case is one case, isn’t it?   If  context is taken into 
account as carefully as you suggest, why was it that the trial judge, who heard all the 
evidence in the case, felt that the context was aggravating rather than mitigating?    To 
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my mind, that raises some doubt about whether  context was understood properly in 
that case.  I admit that is just one case, but it does at least  suggest that  context may 
not be fully  understood in every case.  
 The President:   I am very sorry, time is against us.    
Mr Coonan:   Oh, right, fair enough. 
The President:   Could I give the last question to Martin Mansell?   Then we 
can carry on as long as we like over a glass of wine and some canapés. 
 Dr Mansell:   Obviously I enjoyed the talk.   I will be quick.   I was involved 
in one of the CPS prosecutions, the Garg case.   I was entirely happy that this was 
whatever I understood by gross negligence manslaughter.   There were at least five 
other experts and I think there may have been one or two I never quite made contact 
with, and I would just make the observation that if you put five or six little boys 
together they are all going to start going in the same direction, but, that said, I was 
happy with the Garg case.   My question actually is for yourself.   Why did the judge 
allow the misdirections of the jury in Sellu that led to the successful appeal?   Was he 
trying to leave the door open to an appeal?   Is this conceivable, or are judges not that 
imaginative?    Oliver, what do you think? 
 Dr Quick:   I wouldn’t have thought they would be that crafty, personally.   I 
would have to look at this and get access to all of the jury directions, but I wonder 
(and maybe Mr Coonan can answer this, I don’t know) how different the judge’s 
directions in the Sellu case (Mr Justice Nicol, I believe) were from other cases.  Were 
they really that different from previous cases?. 
 Mr Coonan:   I entirely agree with you.   There is a strong body of legal 
opinion around who were very surprised by the favourable decision in Sellu.   I must 
leave myself out of this, obviously, because I was involved in the trial itself and I am 
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also privy to material which I am not allowed to reveal because of privilege.   
However, the direction (you are quite right) mirrored that in Adomako; it mirrored that 
in Misra and Srivastava, where I defended, and was therefore no different, but what 
the judge did do in Sellu was to lay it on, and there were other (I can give them to 
you) extracts from a number of recent cases, Rudling being one of them, where the 
court there also laid it on more to effectively hit the jury between the eyes so that they 
knew full well what they were determining.   So that is the high point.   There is no 
point of principle in tow at all, in my view.   It simply restated the law, but gave 
emphasis to the central proposition, and on that basis the Court of Appeal took a 
liberal view..... 
  The President:   Let us thank Dr Quick for a most interesting evening 
and talk.   (Applause)     
------------------------- 
